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8. THE OVERALL PICTURE. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OF “IN FOCUS”
György Molnár
The seven extended and five brief studies included in In Focus undertook to 
map the labour market effects – in a broad sense – of the crisis relying on 
the available results of Hungarian empirical research efforts. The authors at-
tempted to widen the scope of their inquiries with the aim of bringing into 
focus the group of households in the centre of the process of the reproduction 
of labour. Their efforts were to some extent constrained, however, by the crite-
rion of evidence-based research. The most recent data available at the time of 
writing the papers covers the first half of 2010 for some of the topics, but only 
2009 for most of them. In some cases the only information available is even 
older. In the absence of suitable data, we were forced to relinquish our original 
plans of discussing changes in household consumption and their relationship 
to the labour market. For some of our topics – the evolution of real wages, for 
instance – it was not possible to make evidence-based international compari-
sons. As the crisis is not quite over yet, it is often impossible to decide whether 
it is the crisis or the pre-crisis Hungarian fiscal consolidation measures that can 
be held responsible for the observed phenomena. We have similarly no way of 
knowing whether recent changes in various processes constitute a turn in the 
trend or are simply temporary fluctuations.
Despite having to face all these constraints, we are confident that our stud-
ies provide a reasonably comprehensive and diversified picture of the impact of 
the crisis on the Hungarian labour market. Rather than presenting new results, 
this closing chapter of In Focus attempts to sketch an overall picture by simply 
summarising the most important conclusions of the 12 studies and pointing 
out the links and parallels between them.84
Labour market responses to the crisis
The public and the private sectors adjusted in diametrically opposed ways to 
the changes in the economy brought about by the crisis, i.e., the decrease in de-
mand and the contraction of the credit market. While the public sector typi-
cally responded by wage cuts, the private sector tended to reduce the workforce 
(see the introductory chapter by Mónika Bálint, Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and 
Ágota Scharle; and Chapter 1 by János Köllő). That is, any figures applying to 
the economy as a whole aggregating the two sectors may be seriously mislead-
ing. The drop in public sector wages is primarily explained by the retraction of 
the 13th month pay and the suspension of pay increases. In this sector, there-
fore, there are no significant structural changes awaiting explanation (Köllő). 
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The studies in In Focus accordingly turn most of their attention to processes 
observed in the private sector.
János Köllő’s model estimations based on corporate panel data lead to sev-
eral interesting conclusions beyond the dominance of workforce downsizing. 
Decreases in staff size and wages were more pronounced than average among 
companies with predominantly male employees. This result suggests that com-
panies involved in production and typically employing male workers fared 
worse than average both in terms of employment and with respect to wages. 
Interestingly, the data paints a different picture of major layoffs: women were 
marginally more likely to be affected by this form of job separation (Busch & 
Lázár, Chapter 3).
Returning to the results of János Köllő’s models, changes in workforce size 
had a relatively strong, while changes in working time had a relatively weak 
relationship with company size. With the companies ranked from smallest to 
largest, there was a steady increase in the extent of workforce reduction. With 
respect to working time, only the largest companies stood out: they implement-
ed more extensive cuts. One explanation may be that the extent of dependence 
on export demand varied with company size. (Let us remember that the estima-
tions are based on data for the first year of the crisis.) The relative employment 
advantage of small companies was substantially greater in manufacturing than 
in other sectors. Citing, once again, the results of Busch & Lázár’s study, half 
of the workers displaced through major layoffs, which typically affected large 
enterprises, were made redundant in the manufacturing industry, which is al-
most two and a half times the share of manufacturing in overall employment.
In terms of the changes in workforce size, the construction industry and 
real estate businesses did not differ significantly from manufacturing: these 
three experienced the heaviest cuts in employment. The labour force statistics 
were considerably more favourable for the water, energy and transport indus-
tries, financial services, personal services, private health care and agriculture. 
Workforce reductions were of a smaller scale at public sector companies than 
at private firms, and companies having collective agreements also lost fewer 
jobs than average.
Wages increased more at companies employing a larger share of workers on 
the minimum wage than at other firms. There was, however, virtually no change 
in real wages at wage levels unaffected by the regulations on the minimum 
wage. During the first year of the crisis, companies in the business sector left 
wages essentially untouched. In the rare cases where there was a change in the 
average wage, this had no systematic relationship with industry, geographical 
region, company size, ownership, labour force composition or the presence/
absence of trade unions.
The analysis of working time cuts suggests that this tool of cost saving did 
not spread beyond the group of companies receiving job preservation support. 
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Within-company changes in employment and in wage rates were independent 
of each other, just as the changes in employment and in working hours were.
Further details are added to this picture – especially with respect to wages – 
by Semjén & Tóth in their brief report 1.B) supplementing Chapter 1. The 
authors discuss the results of a corporate survey conducted in three cycles (in 
March 2009, June 2009 and March 2010), in which company managers were 
interviewed about adjustment strategies in response to the crisis. These strate-
gies of course include measures unrelated to the labour market. In the second 
and third cycles, around 80 per cent of companies mentioned the freezing or 
lowering of wages and other forms of labour compensation as crisis-relief meas-
ures. While at the beginning of 2009 relatively few companies resorted to job 
cuts, in July 2009 the proportion of companies implementing layoffs was over 
40 per cent. The incidence of job cuts returned to a substantially lower level 
by January 2010. The option of part-time employment or reduced working 
hours was chosen by a relatively small, but gradually increasing, percentage of 
companies. Qualitative interviews cannot, of course, provide information as 
to the extent of any of the implemented measures. Comparing these observa-
tions with János Köllő’s results, we may conclude that employment reduction 
measures affected a smaller number of the companies but were substantially 
more drastic than wage-related measures. It is also reasonable to assume that 
managers regarded the policy of keeping real wages level by suspending regular 
pay increases or reducing their usual rate as a crisis-relief measure. It is worth 
noting, however, that among the respondents of the 2010 cycle, the strategy 
of reducing wages and other compensation or keeping them level was, retro-
spectively, far more likely to be seen as an efficient measure than was down-
sizing (15 versus 4 per cent). Of all possible strategies, working time reduction 
was the least likely to be listed as an efficient measure, which may explain its 
infrequent incidence.
As a brief detour, it is worth mentioning that companies typically imple-
mented a number of different crisis-relief measures in parallel (with non-la-
bour market reactions included). The measures included quick solutions (such 
as improving liquidation indicators, cost reduction and credit conversion) as 
well as proactive actions with long-term effects (such as search for new markets, 
organisational restructuring or altering production structure). Companies did 
not seem to develop a special unified crisis-relief strategy. One pattern that 
emerged from the data is that export companies tended to introduce a wider 
range of measures than non-export firms [brief report 1.B) by Semjén & Tóth].
Returning to the question of employment, the data from the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office (HCSO) Labour Force Survey shows that the key 
explanation for the decrease in employment rate is that companies did not 
hire new employees to fill positions vacated through a natural process. The 
probability of exiting employment displayed a rising trend between 2006 and 
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2009, but did not soar during the crisis. The not much faster than usual rate 
of job separations was accompanied, however, by difficulties with fast re-em-
ployment, which led to a substantial increase in unemployment. Presumably, 
this strategy of downsizing – i.e., avoiding major layoffs – was one of the rea-
sons why the soft tools of adjustment, wage and working time reduction, were 
given less weight (Köllő).
The conclusions drawn from the labour survey are corroborated by Busch and 
Lázár’s data in Chapter 3, which relies on obligatory announcements of major 
layoffs. In the time series of major layoffs, only one quarter stands out (the first 
quarter of 2009) while the total number of layoffs in 2009 is barely more than 
the values observed in 2003 and 2004. Also, there were fewer job separations 
during the first half of 2010 than there had been before the crisis. The sharp 
increase in the number of registered unemployed is explained at least as much 
by the decline in outflows than by the increase in inflows.
In their analysis of labour policy reactions to the newly emerged situation, 
both János Köllő’s chapter and Elek & Scharle’s associated brief report 1.A) 
come to the conclusion that the top priority of the Hungarian government 
– similarly to other countries in the region – was to prevent a surge in unem-
ployment by preserving and boosting labour demand. Jobs in the public sec-
tor were protected by the introduction of wage reduction measures while in 
the private sector the primary means of supporting job preservation was the 
expansion of employment subsidies (Köllő). In 2009, the reduction of wage 
costs, specifically the lowering of employer contribution rates, constituted 
one third of government spending on labour demand stimulation. This tool 
has the disadvantage of overly broad targeting as it can affect jobs other than 
those that are at risk and are worth saving. It was, however, a necessary step in 
the restructuring of the Hungarian taxation system, which was needed inde-
pendently of the crisis (Elek & Scharle).
The increase of about 110 thousand people in the number of workers benefit-
ing from job preservation subsidies and public works programmes was achieved 
at the expense of other employment support programmes (wage subsidies for 
those returning to work from unemployment or from maternity leave and for 
new labour market entrants, training programmes and business start-up sup-
port) (Köllő). The neglect of these active employment tools – especially of train-
ing – was virtually unique to Hungary among both the EU and the OECD 
countries. Also unique was the Hungarian decision to reduce substantially the 
staff of the Public Employment Service. The strategy of short-time employ-
ment substantially reduced the number of job separations in several countries. 
In Hungary, slightly less than 1 per cent of employees participated in such a 
programme, which is about the average international level but the efficiency of 
this tool proved to be far lower in Hungary than its average efficiency in other 
countries. (Elek & Scharle).
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It should be mentioned in this connection that about half of the workers dis-
placed through major layoffs and participating in unemployment programmes 
received operative employment services. The share of those benefiting from ac-
tive employment schemes was merely 13 per cent (Busch & Lázár).
The number of those becoming unemployed greatly exceeded the number of 
participants in job preservation or public works programmes (most of the latter 
having been unemployed for a while as specified by the conditions of participa-
tion in the Back to Work programme). Considering the social consequences, it 
is especially distressing that there was a significant increase in the number of 
unemployed workers not receiving individual support, when a growing propor-
tion of the same population – especially recently displaced workers – wanted 
to return to work or were actively involved in job search (Köllő). In most EU 
member states, unemployment compensation was relatively high to begin with 
and was now further increased in some of the countries. The period of entitle-
ment to wage-proportional unemployment compensation is exceptionally short 
in Hungary compared to the rest of Europe (Elek & Scharle).
Decisions in this area were heavily constrained by Hungary’s poor budget 
position quite independently of the crisis. It remains questionable, however, 
whether the policy focusing on job preservation and public job creation was 
well suited to the task of minimising social losses.
Boda and Neumann’s interview data on a small number of companies (Chap-
ter 2) cannot be generalised to the entire private sector but the authors’ find-
ings provide illustrative examples for the conclusions of quantitative analyses, 
large-scale surveys and model estimations. They further have an exploratory 
value, providing ideas for future surveys. Among the companies included in the 
case studies, the majority of job separations were limited to temporary ancil-
lary workers hired from agencies at “peak times”. Permanent contract staff were 
only laid off at companies typically employing unskilled workers and regularly 
relying on the tools of quantitative flexibility. The oversupply of labour in the 
market allowed quality substitutions, and workers of relatively insecure status 
(those on fixed term contracts, working pensioners and those past the statu-
tory retirement age) were the most likely to be discharged. At the same time, 
companies made better use of the skills of staff with several years’ experience 
at the company and qualified to perform a variety of tasks. The case studies 
included large automobile manufacturers and it was these that implemented 
layoffs of the largest scale.
The analysis of corporate major layoffs supports these observations. More 
than 40 per cent of workers displaced through major layoffs had no more than 
primary education, which is 10 percentage points higher than their proportion 
among the unemployed and 30 per cent higher than their proportion among 
the employed population. While the probability of secondary school gradu-
ates being displaced through major layoffs corresponded to their share among 
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the employed population, the position of qualified skilled workers contrasted 
with that of primary school educated employees: the former were significantly 
underrepresented among major layoff job separations. Comparing occupations, 
assembly line assemblers were far ahead of all others in the major layoff ranking 
with other elementary workers coming next (Busch & Lázár).
The company case studies also reveal that the various forms and possibilities 
of working time management were strongly related to the technology used at 
the factories (Boda & Neumann). Most of the companies introduced a working 
time account system before the crisis, which – unlike in the case of American 
and West European examples – unilaterally benefits the employer. This tool 
permits the flexible use of working time but to what extent its possibilities are 
exploited is difficult to trace in official statistics.
The crisis presented a new kind of challenge for corporate trade unions and 
works councils. They had to abandon the bargaining strategy they had followed 
since the mid-1990s focussing almost exclusively on pay rises and employee 
compensation packages. The protection of jobs now came to the forefront. 
(As shown by János Köllő’s chapter, they had certain success in this effort.) It 
is worth noting that, among the case studies, the practice of regular consulta-
tions between the management and the trade union or works council was only 
observed at multinational companies with foreign owners. The trade unions 
and works councils have relatively little power, i.e., they are in a weak bargain-
ing position compared to their West European counterparts. At multinational 
companies, the central management coerces competition between the compa-
ny’s factories with similar technologies and roughly equivalent expenditure. 
“Positive compromises” were mainly reported by the trade unions of companies 
relying on skilled labour and yielding high added value (Boda & Neumann).
The impact of the crisis on regional inequalities
Several mentions have been made of the individual phases of the crisis as it 
spread in Hungary, and the evolution of unemployment figures. In Chapter 4, 
Hajnalka Lőcsei discusses this question along the two dimensions of time and 
space. The duality of the Hungarian economy emerging in the wake of the sys-
tem change, which manifests itself in corporate productivity and in the presence 
of foreign capital, also has some spatial implications. The country is divided 
into two parts: the one in the more favourable position is competitive, capable 
of adjusting to new circumstances and exploiting new possibilities, while the 
other is relatively underdeveloped, fails to attract significant foreign capital 
and falls further and further behind. The main thread running through the 
study is the question of the effects of the recession brought on by the crisis on 
the spatial developmental structure of the Hungarian economy.
The period from autumn 2008 to summer 2010 can be divided into 4 phases: 
1. October 2008 – January 2009: onset of increase in (registered) unemploy-
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ment; 2. January 2009 – June 2009: drastic rise in unemployment; 3. June 2009 
– February 2010: continued but slower increase; 4. February 2010 – August 
2010: gentle decline in unemployment.
During the first phase, the steepest increase in the number and percentage of 
job seekers was observed in the northern and northeastern parts of Transdanu-
bia, which had previously been a stronghold of industrial production. Within 
this area, the crisis hit hardest in regions where the majority of workers com-
muted to manufacturing sites in nearby towns or cities. This phenomenon is re-
lated to the observation mentioned above that export-oriented companies were 
more likely to be affected by the crisis. (This is also corroborated by Busch and 
Lázár’s data on major layoffs.) Some of the heaviest losses were, however, expe-
rienced by micro-regions situated in other, less developed parts of the country. 
This becomes especially clear if we replace the growth index of unemployment 
by a measure of changes expressed in percentage points, since underdeveloped 
micro-regions were characterised by a far higher initial unemployment level.
It is worth comparing these findings with the results of Albert Faluvégi’s brief 
report 4.A) showing that between the third and fourth quarters of 2008, the 
33 most disadvantaged micro-regions suffered a substantially steeper overall 
increase in unemployment (3.8 percentage points) than did the group of dis-
advantaged (0.5 percentage points) or the group of relatively developed (0.2 
percentage points) micro-regions. This breakdown of the data shows that the 
marked increase in unemployment characterising the micro-regions of North- 
and West-Transdanubia was offset by the developed micro-regions in other 
parts of the country.
Returning to Hajnalka Lőcsei’s study, in the next phase of the period the ef-
fects of the crisis were no longer limited to the surroundings of export-oriented 
manufacturing plants but spread to a growing number of industries and regions 
while still remaining concentrated along the internal periphery of northwest 
Hungary. During this phase, proximity played an important role as the effects 
of layoffs at one or another large company propagated throughout the area. 
There was little change in the capital city or its surroundings and the Lake Bal-
aton area was also spared although the “untouched” zone steadily contracted.
During the third phase, when changes in the number and percentage of job 
seekers are primarily determined by seasonal effects, the spatial structure of the 
rise in unemployment remained relatively stable. The effects of the crisis were, 
however, increasingly felt in Central-Hungary, which is explained by the fact 
that the economy of the capital is dominated by the service sector, where most 
losses were suffered later than in export-oriented industrial sectors. The only 
areas not showing a decline were the most underdeveloped internal and exter-
nal peripheries of the country, where unemployment figures were already very 
high at the start. In some micro-regions, in fact, there was an improvement, 
perhaps as a result of public works programmes.
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In line with the above pattern, Albert Faluvégi’s analysis, ending with De-
cember 2009, shows that while unemployment rose steadily throughout the 
year in the relatively developed regions of the country, some improvement could 
be observed in the most disadvantaged micro-regions in the first half of 2009 
(although the figures did not reach their pre-crisis level) and the unemploy-
ment curve stabilised in the second half of the year. As a result of these process-
es the unemployment rate among the most disadvantaged micro-regions first 
increased from about 2.3 times to 2.7 times the national average by the end of 
2008, and then decreased to 1.9 times the national average by the end of 2009.
During the fourth phase, starting in February 2010, partly owing to seasonal 
effects there was a decrease in the percentage of job seekers in the agricultur-
al areas of Eastern Hungary, in the regions around Lake Balaton, and in the 
most disadvantaged regions with the highest unemployment levels (Cserehát, 
Szatmár and Ormánság). This phenomenon is best attributed to the effects of 
public works programmes (Lőcsei).
All these changes together led to a distinctive regional convergence, which 
was effected not by an improvement in the circumstances of regions in unfa-
vourable positions but by a steeper decline in the employment rates of relative-
ly developed regions. The convergence process continued in spring 2010 but 
now, unlike before, the underlying cause was the improvement experienced by 
relatively underdeveloped micro-regions. Notwithstanding these changes, the 
spatial structure of unemployment was not significantly altered by the crisis. It 
remains a fact that unemployment rates are substantially higher than average 
in the micro-regions of South-Transdanubia and in the micro-regions located 
east of the Balassagyarmat-Békéscsaba axis, the only exceptions being the la-
bour catchment areas of regional urban centres.
It remains an open question whether this convergence can be maintained 
in the long term or – since the improvement is not supported by an economic 
boom – we can expect the gap, which remains considerable and generates so-
cial tensions, to stretch further.
On the whole, the percentage of job seekers increases with a decrease in the 
population size of settlements, but this rule applies less strictly to more devel-
oped regions. The various categories of settlements only showed significant 
differences for the phases of the crisis characterised by either a sharp surge or a 
sudden dip in the number of job seekers. During the spreading phase, the rel-
atively large regional urban centres typically “delegated” the negative effects 
to smaller settlements.
The issue of commuting is therefore a key factor in the evolution of regional 
employment differences. A likely explanation for the local labour market inflex-
ibility of underdeveloped regions is that the populations of their villages incur 
high commuting costs if they take up employment in towns. The brief report by 
Tamás Bartus in Chapter 4.B) explores the wage advantage of unskilled workers 
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living at a given distance from the labour market of an urban centre. The study 
asks whether the wage returns to commuting cover the costs of travelling to 
work. The available data suitable for model estimations only covers the pre-crisis 
period but important conclusions can be drawn from the model nevertheless.
The study looks at the spatial distribution of paid labour opportunities in the 
local labour market areas of Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen, Nyíregyháza and Miskolc 
with Győr being used as a control town. The results of the model reveal that 
average hourly wage rates in villages decrease with the increase of the distance 
between the village and the regional urban centre. The effects of distance from 
the centre are strongest in the labour market of Győr, where the wage advan-
tage fully compensates for the costs of even half an hour’s journey. In disad-
vantaged regions, however, the estimated costs of time lost by commuting are 
equal to or exceed the accessible wage surplus.
Undeclared employment
The authors of the studies discussed so far drew their conclusions from employ-
ment and unemployment data provided by various statistical sources, which, 
necessarily, prevented them from including undeclared employment in their 
analyses. The available empirical evidence related to this question is unfortu-
nately limited to the pre-crisis period. In Chapter 5 András Semjén and István 
János Tóth discuss the results of two population surveys, one ran in autumn 
2007 and the other in spring 2008, and attempt to estimate the possible effects 
of the crisis in connection with undeclared employment. As such, the study 
raises some fundamental questions in this research area demonstrating the im-
perative need for repeated cycles of the previous surveys. There is also plenty to 
learn, however, from the information gained concerning the pre-crisis period.
Within undeclared employment, the authors focus on two types: “cash in 
hand” (non disclosed payment), which usually supplements legal pay and “in-
voice payment”, when some of the wages are paid into an employee’s business 
account as if he or she was a subcontractor. Altering the internal structure of 
labour compensation packages containing both tax compliant and tax evasive 
elements in favour of the latter may constitute an interesting cost reduction 
strategy used by companies in addition to those discussed so far.
In spring 2008, one in four workers aged between 18 and 60 received cash in 
hand or invoice payments during the two years preceding the interview. Both 
types of payment, but especially cash in hand, were more likely to be received 
by men than by women. Cash in hand was substantially more frequent among 
young workers than among older people. In most cases either one or the oth-
er payment option was used and the targets of the two payment methods had 
characteristic distinguishing features: while cash in hand was typically given 
to workers with at most primary education, invoice payments tended to be 
made to higher education graduates.
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The regional characteristics of undeclared employment show an interesting 
relationship with the geographical distribution of unemployment. Undeclared 
employment is considerably more frequent in the counties of eastern Hungary, 
while it is less frequent than average in western Hungary. In eastern Hungary, 
40 per cent of employees and casual labourers received cash in hand or invoice 
payment. The incidence of undeclared employment is highest among workers 
performing non-regular jobs (casual labourers and the unemployed). More than 
half of this population had jobs involving tax evasion by one or another means 
(usually through cash in hand) during the two years preceding the interview.
Based on the results of their analysis, the authors distinguish a total of 13 
categories of change in compensation packages and look at companies’ possi-
ble responses to the crisis in terms of the ratios of declared versus undeclared 
employment or employment disguised as subcontracted services. The authors 
conclude that the economic crisis is highly likely to have been accompanied 
by an increase in the incidence and quantity of undeclared or disguised em-
ployment, as both the majority of viable corporate adjustment strategies and 
employers’ interests point in this direction. There is no doubt, however, that 
not all evidence converges. In the construction industry for instance – where 
undeclared labour is far more frequent than in other industries – the volume 
of production fell substantially more sharply than did declared employment, 
which suggests that cuts were more likely to affect undeclared employment.
The effect of the crisis on households
The two closing chapters of In Focus and a brief report look at the impact of the 
crisis on households focusing, in the absence of consumption data, on household 
income. Chapter 6 by Gáspár and Kiss first analyses the panel data of the Labour 
Force Survey to identify the factors influencing the probability of becoming un-
employed during the crisis period. The authors’ results appear to show a greater 
crisis-induced increase in the incidence of job losses compared to János Köllő’s 
figures (see Figures 1.4 and 6.1). As an explanation, we should point out an im-
portant methodological difference between the two studies, which follows from 
their differing aims. While János Köllő used employment to non-employment 
transitions as data, Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis disregarded job losses where 
the worker became inactive rather than unemployed. The latter study therefore 
explores the income effects of entering unemployment. (Household incomes in 
2009 are discussed in Chapter 8 by Tóth and Medgyesi).
Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis’s model includes gender, age, educational at-
tainment, geographical location and economic sector as explanatory variables. 
The authors conclude that with the exception of the employee’s gender, all of 
the factors have a strong effect on the probability of job loss. The youngest co-
hort are more likely to lose their jobs compared to older cohorts and the prob-
ability of job losses continues to decrease slowly with the advance of age. This 
molnár: the overall picture
201
probability also decreases with higher educational attainment. Looking at 
economic sectors, the construction and the accommodation and food service 
activities show an outstandingly high job loss probability. The likelihood of 
job loss is also high in manufacturing.
In the next section of the chapter, the authors link the job loss probabilities 
among the employed population to the data of the Household Budget Survey 
of 2007, and using this pre-crisis data, ran a simulation of the rise in unemploy-
ment, which is – from the households’ point of view – perhaps the most im-
portant consequence of the crisis. Household incomes were indexed to 2009 
price levels and taxes corresponding to 2009 tax regulations were deducted.
Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis conclude that the probability of job loss de-
creases with the increase in household income: job losses in the lowest income 
decile are almost three times as frequent as they are in the top decile. While 
the absolute value of the average income loss incurred with a job loss increases 
with income, the relative income loss is similar across the income groups. In 
another model, the data was corrected for the fact that job losses would have 
also occurred independently of the crisis. In this model there were weaker in-
come effects but the distribution of the effect was essentially the same, with 
only one difference: the relative income loss was somewhat lower for lower in-
come deciles compared to higher income deciles.
The authors also investigate to what extent unemployment benefits (specif-
ically job seeker’s allowance and job seeker’s support) compensate for losses. 
The benefits lowered households’ relative income losses by 0.4–1.1 percentage 
points; the level of compensation was relatively stable across the income groups 
with the exception of the top decile, where it was lower.
In Chapter 7, István György Tóth and Márton Medgyesi analyse Tárki 
Household Monitor Survey data to show the long-term evolution of the ma-
jor indicators in income distribution, with special emphasis on the changes be-
tween 2007 and 2009. These processes reflect the effects of not only the current 
crisis but also the fiscal consolidation programmes of previous years. The first 
phase of the crisis in the second half of 2008 primarily affected those who had 
significant savings and for some reason had no choice but to realise losses in 
their savings. The next phase of the crisis reached households firstly through 
the increases in loan repayment instalments and in the interest on foreign cur-
rency denominated loans and secondly through the rise in unemployment. In 
the third phase of the crisis, the effects were mediated by the cuts in govern-
ment spending which had public consequences and by the contraction of the 
government’s welfare system.
Between 2007 and 2009, there was a decline in the income position of both 
the rich and the poor, and household incomes on average lost about 7 per cent 
of their real value. The decline was, however, substantially greater among the 
poor: even their nominal income showed a decrease, and the ratio of the top 
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to the lowest income decile average income grew from 6.8 to 7.2. The relative 
position of those in the 7th-9th deciles improved however. It is probably the 
complexity of the change that accounts for the fact that the various inequality 
indicators show some inconsistencies.
A previous analysis of 2007 data revealed a process of income depolarization 
whereby the upper middle classes moved down while the lower middle classes 
moved up on the income scale. The most significant change shown by the most 
recent data is polarization at the lower end of the income distribution, i.e., an 
increase in the percentage of low-income households as defined by the decile 
boundaries of 2005. Looking at employment polarization, the authors con-
clude that households having at least two workers in the previous period suf-
fered more than any other type of household from the decrease in employment.
The second part of the study looks at household debts and repayment dif-
ficulties. One process to consider in this regard is the decrease in household 
income while the other process is the increase of loan repayment instalments 
due to exchange rate fluctuations. In her brief report 7.A), Zsuzsa Kapitány 
shows that in the early and mid-2000s, household consumption behaviour was 
characterised by a low propensity to save and a preference for consumption on 
credit and for home ownership investments. As a result, there was a surge in 
borrowing with an especially sharp increase in foreign currency loans.
The Tárki data reveal that following a period of stability, the proportion of 
households reporting that they were living in financial need or having finan-
cial difficulties increased between 2007 and 2009. Loan repayment difficulties 
became more frequent especially among comparatively low-income groups. In 
2009, 35 per cent of households had debts with a bank or financial institution, 
which is a 15 per cent increase compared to the beginning of the decade. At the 
same time, there was a convergence between households at the two ends of the 
income distribution in terms of the likelihood of having bank loans. While 
in 2001, the gap between the top and the lowest income quintiles was more 
than 10 percentage points in terms of the likelihood of having bank loans, this 
difference completely disappeared by 2009. Among households in the lowest 
income quintile, the incidence of bank loans started increasing around 2003, 
and this trend continued uninterrupted for the remainder of the decade. That 
is, a considerable share of these households joined the loan fever just as the 
loan opportunities were coming to an end. The increase in the proportion of 
households taking our personal loans was higher than average among the poor, 
which is probably explained by their need to overcome financial difficulties.
It could be the case, of course, that the explanation for the convergence is 
that middle class families that had taken out loans at some earlier date expe-
rienced a substantial decline in their income level moving them to the lowest 
income quintile but it could also be the result of households in the lowest in-
come quintile taking out loans.
molnár: the overall picture
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Households with bank loans on average paid about a fifth of their total in-
come towards bank loan debts in January 2010. For the lowest income quintile, 
however, the corresponding figure is 29 per cent. With non-bank loans taken 
into consideration, the gap between the income groups becomes considerably 
larger. On average, households paid a quarter of their income towards debts, 
while the lowest quintile spent 43 per cent of their income on repayment in-
stalments.
In 2009, about 9 per cent of households with loans reported that they could 
not always afford to pay their instalments. The corresponding proportion was 
17 per cent for the lowest quintile.
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority data analysed in the brief 
report by Zsuzsa Kapitány indicates a substantially higher frequency of loan 
repayment arrears. The incidence of repayment delays of over 90 days increased 
from 17.6 per cent in December 2008 to 22.9 per cent in March 2010. There 
may be a number of factors accounting for the discrepancy between the results. 
First, a household may have more than one loan and those with more loans are 
more likely to be in arrears with their repayments. Second, while the House-
hold Monitor Survey data applies to 2009, the Financial Supervisory Author-
ity figures show cumulated values.
The crisis forced households to limit their borrowing substantially, especially 
their housing mortgage loan borrowing. In 2009, household loan repayments 
exceeded the value of new loans, and in terms of their nominal receivables and 
liabilities the household sector had a negative balance.
The credit crisis also led to a slowdown in residential building construction 
and by 2009 even nominal house prices were on the decline. For most house-
holds having a low level of financial assets and a relatively high level of real 
property assets, the steady depreciation of real property predicts a rapid and 
significant change in household consumption behaviour.
